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Interest Arbitration Clauses in §8(F)
Pre-Hire Agreements: Effective for

Achieving Genuine Collective
Bargaining or Enabling Parties to
Underhandedly Gain Majority
Bargaining Power?
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 2 v. McElroy's, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Sheet Metal Workers' InternationalAss 'n, Local Union No. 2 v. McElroy's
Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether
an employer was required to submit to interest arbitration with a union under the
pre-hire agreement entered into by the parties. The applicability of the statutory
standards for pre-hire agreements to bargained-for labor and employment contracts is an essential element of this case. When interpreting federal statutory law,
the majority of jurisdictions permit unilateral repudiation upon the expiration of a
pre-hire agreement and a small minority of jurisdictions allow for the agreement
to be repudiated unilaterally during its term. However, in considering these principles, the courts have not provided as clear a standard as to how interest arbitration clauses can be used contractually to provide for non-reputable pre-hire
agreements between employers and unions. Consequently, it is a question that
must be resolved to achieve uniformity in federal labor law. In the instant decision, the Tenth Circuit upheld the application of the interest arbitration clause in a
pre-hire agreement as consistent with the decisions of other circuit courts that had
been presented with similar contract language.2 Unfortunately, the court left open
the question of whether a pre-hire agreement that provides for no avenue of repudiation upon the contract's expiration date and rather a duty to negotiate or accept
arbitrated terms, is an inappropriate waiver of the rights statutory policy sought to
provide in bargaining relationships.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
McElroy's, Inc. ("McElroy's") and Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, Local Union No. 77 ("Union") "entered into a pre-hire agreement authorized by § 8(f)3 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 'A The pre-hire
1. 500 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2007).
2. See generally id. at 1096-1099.
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (2004) (this is referred to below as Section 8(f) of the NLRA). Section
8(f) of the NLRA states:
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agreement had an expiration date of May 31, 2005, an "extension clause," and an
"interest arbitration clause." 5 The relevant portion of the extension clause, Article
XIII, Section I(A), provided that the agreement:
"shall continue in force from year to year" after the expiration date "unless written notice of reopening is given [to the other party] not less than
ninety (90) days prior to the expiration date." If such notice is given, the
agreement continues in force and effect "until conferences relating thereto have been terminated by either party, provided, however, that the contract expiration date ... shall not be effective in the event proceedings
6
under Article X[,] Section 8 are not completed prior to that date."
Article X, Section 8, the interest arbitration clause, provided that "'any controversy or dispute arising out of failure of the parties to negotiate a renewal of
this agreement shall be settled' pursuant to the procedure set forth in that section." The interest arbitration clause also provided that if "negotiations for renewal of this Agreement become deadlocked.., either party may submit the dispute to the [National Joint Adjustment Board (NJAB)I" for
arbitration and that the
8
decision of the NJAB is final and binding on the parties.
The parties performed under the contract for almost three years. 9 On February 25, 2005, McElroy's notified the Union that it intended to terminate the
agreement on its expiration date. 10 In response, the Union sent notice to McElroy's that same day indicating that the Union sought to reopen negotiations pursuant to Article XIII of the agreement.' McElroy's did not respond, and thereafter, the Union made numerous other requests to McElroy's to negotiate a renewal,
which McElroy's either denied or ignored.1 2 When McElroy's refused to negotiate, the Union submitted the dispute to the NJAB asserting that under the terms
of the agreement, McElroy's was obligated to negotiate for the renewal of the

It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering
employees engaged ... in the building and construction industry with a labor organization ...
because (1)the majority status of such labor organization has not been established under the provisions of section 159 of this title prior to the making of such agreement ....
Id.
4. McElroy's, 500 F.3d at 1095. McElroy's is a mechanical contractor with its principal place of
business in Topeka, Kansas and is organized under the laws of Kansas. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l
Ass'n, Local Union No. 2 v. McElroy's Inc., No. 05-4086-RDR, 2006 WL 1044465, at *1 (D. Kan.
Apr. 18, 2006). Union is the successor in interest to the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, Local Union No. 77 by virtue of a voluntary merger of Local Union No. 2 and Local Union No.
77 supervised by the parent organization of the two Locals, the Sheet Metal Workers' International
Association. Id.
5. McElroy's, 500 F.3d at 1095.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id at 1095-96.
9. Id. at 1095.
10. Id.
11. Id at 1096.
12. Id
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contract. 13 This submission was five days before the date the agreement was set to
expire. 14 The NJAB issued an order directing the parties to execute a three-year
renewal agreement with specified terms.15 McElroy's refused to comply and, in
response, the Union filed an action in federal district court to enforce the NJAB's
decision. 16
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas rejected the contention set forth by McElroy's that McElroy's had the right to repudiate the contract on the expiration date and accepted the Union's argument that the agreement
would not expire on May 31, 2005, without both parties' consent. 17 The District
Court found that a failure of one side to participate in negotiations for a renewal of
an agreement amounted to a "failure of the parties to negotiate a renewal" which
triggered the interest arbitration provision in Article X, Section 8.18 Additionally,
the court held that while employers in a § 8(f) pre-hire agreement with a union do
not have a statutory obligation to negotiate for a successor contract, a binding
contractual obligation to do so may be created under the terms of a labor agreement. 19 Thus, the court denied McElroy's motion for summary judgment and
granted the Union's motion to confirm the arbitration award.20
McElroy's appealed the order of the district court. 2 1 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that because the plain language of the agreement obligated the
parties to negotiate a renewal agreement or to have one imposed upon them if one
party gave a timely notice of a desire to renew, the submission to arbitration was
proper since the agreement had not been terminated and the NJAB's order directing the parties to enter into a renewal agreement was correct. 22
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Administrative and Judicial Interpretationof Pre-HireAgreements
In general, a collective bargaining representative or union must be designated
by a majority of the employees in a given unit before that representative can have
23
the exclusive right to represent the employees in bargaining with the employer.
An exception to this general rule for the construction industry arose when the
NLRA added Section 8(f) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 ("LMRDA"). 24 LMRDA intended for 8(f) to rectify certain problems
13. Id. McElroy's did not attend the June 27 hearing, but did send a letter and memorandum to the
NJAB which set forth its view that it was not obligated to negotiate with the Union. Id.
14. Id
15. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 2 v. McElroy's Inc., No. 05-4086-RDR,
2006 WL 1044465, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 18, 2006).
16. McElroy's, 500 F.3d at 1096.
17. McElroy's Inc., 2006 WL 1044465, at *2-3. The district court framed the issue before it as,
"[W]hen did or when does the agreement expire[?]" and stated that this issue would require construction of the contract. Id. at *2.
18. Id. at *5.
19. Id.
20. Id. at *6.
21. McElroy's, 500 F.3d at 1096.
22. Id. at 1098-99.
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006).
24. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 167, 172-187 (2006).
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in the building and construction industry by allowing for employers and unions to
enter into agreements before any employees are hired and prior to a showing of
majority support by the union, circumstances that would have otherwise constituted unfair labor practices. 25 In the construction industry today there is a presumtion that a union and an employer intend their relationship to be governed by
8(f). 6 Following the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement,
27 this presumption has substantial impact on the parties' bargaining relationship.
The NLRB construed 8(f) narrowly for many years, holding that a pre-hire
agreement was voidable-at-will since it was "merely a preliminary step to the
creation of a full collective bargaining agreement." 2 This interpretation was formalized in Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, where the United States Supreme Court recognized that a party has an "undoubted right to repudiate a prehire agreement...
,,29
However, the Court did not clarify when a specific act or acts were sufficient
to accomplish repudiation. 30 Since McNeff, there has not been a consistent delineation of the specific acts
necessary before a court will recognize the repudiation of
3
a pre-hire agreement. '
A major development in the NLRB's approach to Section 8(f) was pronounced in John Deklewa & Sons. 32 Deklewa established the principle that "upon
the expiration of such [pre-hire] agreements, the signatory union will enjoy no
presumption of majority status, and either party [may] repudiate the 8(f) bargaining relationship. 33 The concept that an "8(f) signatory employer may unilaterally
repudiate following the expiration of the 8(f) agreement" is a distinct aspect of
agreements in construction industry, which rely on § 8(f) agreements, compared to
the other industries covered by the NLRA, which are governed by § 9(a).34 The
Deklewa decision pronounced that Section 8(f) agreements would be enforceable
through the mechanism of Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) 35 and could not be unilate-

25. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 958 (Patrick Hardin & John E. Higgins, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 2001)
(citing King & La Vaute, Current Trends in Construction Industry Labor Relations, The DoubleBreasted Contractorand the Prehire Contract, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 901 (1978)). See also Jim
McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 266 (1983) (explaining that the exceptions granted by section 8(f)
are due to special factors, such as the "uniquely temporary, transitory and sometimes seasonal nature
of much of the employment in the construction industry.").
26. See Casale Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 951, 952 (1993). "[T]he Board presumes that parties in
the construction industry intend their relationship to be an 8() relationship. Thus, the burden is on the
party who seeks to show the contrary, i.e., that the parties intend a Section 9 relationship." Id. (citations omitted).
27. John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1381-84 (1987).
28. James M Wilton, Changed Interpretationof Section 8() of the National Labor Relations Act:
Mesa Verde Construction Co. v. Northern California District Council of Laborers, 31 B.C. L. REV.
114, 115 (citing Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 702 (1971) and R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191
N.L.R.B. 693,695 (1971)).
29. McNeff, 461 U.S. at 269-70.
30. Id.
31. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 961-62 n. 1115.
32. 282 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1987).
33. Id. at 1377-78.
34. Brian A. Caufield, Reversion to Conversion? The Board's Interpretation of the Interplay Between Sections 8(t) and 9(a) in the ConstructionIndustry, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 413, 418 (2006).

35. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) & (b)(3). Section 8(b)(3) of the Act provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization that represents employees "to refuse to bargain collectively
with an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3). Like section 8(a)(5), the counterpart provision prohibiting
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rally repudiated during their term.36 It was noted by commentators following the
opinion's release that Dekelewa's principles "will increase stability by preventing
repudiation of pre-hire agreements" and will lead to employers and unions being
more cognizant of their rights and obligations during the terms of their agreements. 37 The interpretations of § 8(f) set forth in Deklewa have been consistently
enforced by the NJLB.38 However, courts' application of the rules of Deklewa has
not been without conflict in the circuits and the Supreme Court has not yet resolved the issue.
In Industrial Turnaround Corp. v. NLRB, 39 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the findings of the NLRB where the Board had interpreted § 8(f) of
the NLRA as prohibiting either parZ to a pre-hire agreement under § 8(f) from
unilaterally revoking the agreement. The court stated that it was precluded from
adopting Deklewa as the law of the circuit because it was bound by prior Supreme
Court and Fourth Circuit precedent. 4' The Fourth Circuit found that a party's
letter notifying the other party to a pre-hire agreement of its intent to terminate
operated as an effective repudiation even though the letter did not comply with the
termination provision of the agreement.42 The court interpreted Fourth Circuit
precedent as making it clear that "an employer's notification of repudiation need
not comply with the termination provision of the agreement 'if the agreement is a
pre-hire agreement under section 8(f).' 43 This decision was in contrast to the
majority of circuits who had accepted the Dekelwa interpretation of § 8(f) pre-hire
agreements either expressly or implicitly. 44
B. Interest Arbitrationand Labor Agreements
In pre-hire agreements governed under Section 8(f), parties often include an
interest arbitration clause in their agreements. 45 In a collective-bargaining agreement, an interest arbitration clause "authorizes binding arbitration of deadlocks

employers from refusing to bargain, section 8(b)(3) has been interpreted to require good-faith bargaining.
36. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1389. See also Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. N. Cal. Dist. Council of
Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. Banc 1988) (finding that the Act prohibits the unilateral repudiation
of prehire collective bargaining agreements priorto termination of contract).
37. See, e.g., Wilton, supra note 28, at 125.
38. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 962-63 n. 1120.
39. 115 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 1997).
40. Id. at 253-55.
41. Id. at 254. The court found that the Deklewa decision stood in conflict with Clark v. Ryan, 818
F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1987), and that one panel of the circuit cannot overrule a prior panel decision. Id. It
is noted, however, that the court's reasoning has not gone without criticism and skepticism from commentators and other courts. See generally J. Mitchell Armbruster, Deference Defiantly Denied: The
Fourth CircuitRejects NLRB Position on 8(f) Pre-HireAgreements in Industrial Turnaround Corp. v.
NLRB, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2331 (1998).
42. Turnaround, 115 F.3d at 255.
43. Id. (citing Clark, 818 F.2d at 1106-07).
44. See generally Armbruster, supra note 41, at 2332-52.
45. See Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 20 v. Baylor Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc.,
877 F.2d 547, 555 ("we find no 'well defined and dominant ... explicit public policy' that prevents
employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing to include an interest arbitration clause in a prehire
agreement.") (citations omitted).
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that occur during renewal negotiations." 46 "The rationale for interest arbitration..
*is to protect the [involved] parties themselves from the harm caused by employing economic power to resolve impasses.7
"The ...NLRB has ruled that [a] provision [for interest arbitration to settle
bargaining impasses] is not a mandatory topic of bargaining., 48 Consequently,
although parties are free to voluntarily negotiate a provision for interest arbitration
to settle bargaining impasses, neither side can insist on the provision to the point
of deadlock. 49 Thus, this bargaining principle operates under the assumption that
the parties will come to an agreement over the provision only if each side finds it
advantageous. 50 While there has been little controversy with voluntary agreement
to interest arbitration, mandatory interest arbitration clauses have generated considerable debate as contradictory to the principles of genuine collective bargaining51
A question that arises as to the effect of interest arbitration on labor agreements is its effect on the parties' negotiation behavior. A specific inquiry into this
general question deals with the potential for what has been called the "chilling
effect," or how parties' willingness to engage in serious bargaining is affected by
the availability of interest arbitration as the final step in the process of negotiation. 2 One hypothesis is that "one or both parties may not want to bargain because they believe that they can receive a better award in arbitration than in a
negotiated settlement., 53 Another query arises over the "narcotic effect," that is,
how subsequent negotiations are impacted by interest arbitration experience. 54 A
suggested theory is that when parties have negotiations that end in interest arbitration, these parties "will be more likely to rely on arbitration to resolve impasses in
future negotiations. 55 While these hypotheses are applicable to interest arbitration in all labor agreements, the theories seem especially relevant to pre-hire
agreements given how much a party's statutory bargaining rights and obligations
under § 8(f) agreements can be altered by contractual provisions.

46. See W. Coast Sheet Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 938 F.2d 1356, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
47. J. Joseph Loewenberg, Interest Arbitration: Past, Present,and Future, in LABOR ARBITRATION
UNDER FIRE 111 (James L. Stem & Joyce M. Najita eds., 1997).
48. Id. at 113 (citing Lathers Local 42 of Wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers Int'l Union v. Lathing Contractors Ass'n of S. Cal., 223 N.L.R.B. 37 (1976)).
49. &d.
50. Id. at 114.
51. Id. (quoting BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR & FRED WrrNEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 573-74 (5th ed.
1987) ("'If there is one fixed principle of labor relations, and one that is underscored by incontrovertible evidence, it is that a system of compulsory arbitration is incompatible with genuine collective
bargaining. Realistic compromises, concessions, and counterproposals designed to reach settlement
are simply not made out of the fear that by such action a party will prejudice its position before the
arbitrator."').
52. Id. at 117-18.
53. Id. Additionally, the hypothesis contends that "any change in each party's initial bargaining
position may reduce the likelihood of obtaining a favorable award, especially if the arbitrator is expected to split the difference in the parties' positions in the award." Id. at 118.
54. Id.
55. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2008/iss1/16

6

No. 1]

Riske: Riske: Interest Arbitration Clauses in Sec. 8(F) Pre-Hire Agreements
InterestArbitration Clauses in §8(f) Pre-HireAgreements

339

C. ContractualObligations in Pre-HireAgreements
While the Deklewa decision makes it clear that repudiation is not permitted
during the term of agreements governed by 8(f), there has not been a universal
rule accepted by all of the circuits as to how the principles of the decision should
be applied when a pre-hire agreement contains terms that alter the parties' statutory rights and obligations. Interest arbitration is but one of the restrictions that can
be contractually imposed upon a party's ability to terminate an 8(f) agreement
unilaterally. 56 Some circuits have held that "an employer cannot escape the interest arbitration clause by refusing to negotiate, because the contract imposes" an
obligation to actively participate in negotiations or accept the decision imposed by
the arbitrators. 57 This is because some courts have interpreted these agreements,
which often contain very similar provisions, as providing that the agreement will
continue in force until negotiations have produced a renewal agreement and, if
one party refuses to negotiate, for a renewal contract imposed by the NJAB.58
Cases where there is a clause in the agreement providing for interest arbitration
when a notice of reopening has been properly served have been strict in their requirements of proper notice before requiring arbitration. 9 However, in these
cases when proper notice has been timely served pursuant to the agreement, the
other party has not been able to successfully argue that
negotiations have not be6
gun until both parties have actually begun negotiating. 0
While many courts have addressed questions over when interest arbitration is
triggered from a lack of one party's participation in negotiation, there has been
less in-depth analysis by courts as to the consequences for the parties to a pre-hire
agreement when the agreement has been contractually altered so that there is no
provision that can be interpreted as allowing for termination at the agreement's
expiration date. Specifically, when the parties' agreement contains an interest
arbitration clause, statutory issues pertaining to pre-hire agreements have been
found to come into conflict with contract principles. For example, the 7th Circuit
Court of Appeals in Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 20 v. Baylor Heating
and Air Conditioning, Inc.,61 in upholding an interest arbitration award, stated that
56. See Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 545 v. Hope Elec. Corp., 380 F.3d 1084,
1090 n.5 (8th Cir. 2004).
57. See Beach Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union
No. 102, 55 F.3d 474, 477 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local 110
Pension Trust Fund v. Dane Sheet Metal, Inc., 932 F.2d 578, 581-82 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
"Article X, § 8 does seem to embody a requirement that the parties engage in negotiations"); Sheet
Metal Workers Local Union No. 20 v. Baylor Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 877 F.2d 547 (7th Cir.
1989) (rejecting the employer's argument that such an imposition violated public policy favoring
voluntary bargaining and voluntary agreement because the duty to negotiate had been voluntarily
accepted by the employer).
58. See Cedar Valley Corp. v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that an automatic renewal provision extends the life of a pre-hire agreement thereby extending the duration of
Deklawa's no-unilateral-repudiation rule).
59. See Beach Air Conditioning, 55 F.3d at 478 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local
Union No. 150 v. Air Systems Eng'g, Inc., 948 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990) ("In the absence of
such notice, [the party who did not serve the notice] had no obligation to submit to arbitration, and
neither the NJAB nor the courts had jurisdiction over the dispute.")).
60. Il at 478 n.3. ("[Tlhe dispositive factor was the agreement's clear requirement that negotiations or arbitration take place only after one party has given timely notice to reopen.").
61. 877 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1989).
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it found it "unnecessary to determine whether Deklewa expresses the current law
governing repudiation of pre-hire agreements ....
[because] Deklewa [does not]
control when the parties voluntarily agree to a broad interest arbitration clause
with an automatic renewal provision. 62 Additionally, in Beach Air Conditioning
& Heating, Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Intern. Ass'n, Local Union No. 102,63 the
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld an interest arbitration award and, in so
concluding, rejected the employer's argument that "reading the agreement to include a duty to negotiate a renewal contravenes the parties' intent because no
employer would enter into a self-perpetuating relationship with no avenue of escape." 64 Although many pre-hire agreements contain common renewal language
that provides for negotiation over a renewal agreement or to have a subsequent
agreement imposed by an arbitrator, in light of the varying interpretations found in
these cases and the cases of other jurisdictions faced with interest arbitration
clauses in pre-hire agreements, questions remain. Consequently, parties continue
to enter into pre-hire agreements and raise issues as to their rights to repudiate
their agreements because there is no universal rule as to the effect of an interest
arbitration clause on pre-hire agreements when taking into account the applicability of the principles and policy considerations set forth by Dekelwa and its progeny.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Sheet Metal Workers' InternationalAss 'n, Local Union No. 2 v. McElroy's
Inc.,65 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was faced with the
question of whether McElroy's, after submitting a notice of intent to terminate a
pre-hire agreement upon its expiration date, had a contractual obligation to negotiate a renewal contract. 66 McElroy's did not have a statutory obligation to negotiate. 67 However, upon receiving notice of McElroy's intentions, Union provided
McElroy's with notice of reopening pursuant to the time provisions of the agreement.6 8 The Court, in considering the issues presented, formulated the fundamental question to be whether
McElroy's was bound under the agreement to engage in
69
interest arbitration.
On appeal, McElroy's argued that it did not have an obligation to negotiate
for a renewal agreement because it had an absolute right to terminate the agreement on the date of expiration. 70 In addition, McElroy's argued that since the
62. Id. at 556. The court denied the request of the National Labor Relations Board to stay the appeal
because the Board wanted to consider the effect of an interest arbitration clause on Deklewa. Id. at 554
n.5.
63. 55 F.3d 474 (9th Cir. 1995).
64. Id. at 478.
65. 500 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2007).
66. Id. at 1096.
67. Id. at 1097. The Court based this conclusion on the Deklewa interpretation of §8(f) agreements
as not unilaterally voidable prior to their expiration date which was upheld by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals in NLRB v. Viola Indus. Elevator Div., Inc., 979 F.2d 1384, 1394 (10th Cir. 1992) (en

banc). Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1096.
70. Id. at 1097.
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parties had not negotiated for the renewal of the contract, the "deadlock" that
would initiate the Article X, Section 8 procedures did not occur and, as a result,
7
'
McElroy's did not have an obligation under the clause to arbitrate the dispute.
The Court expressly stated that there is "nothing in the NRLA [that] prohibits
either party from repudiating a pre-hire obligation upon the [agreement's] expiration.",7 ' However, the Court noted that "[w]hether the [agreement] itself permits
repudiation ... is another matter., 73 The Court stated that there was "nothing in
the NLRA, the NLRB's decision, or [their] precedent [that would] release[] McElroy's from [its] ... contractual obligation[s]. 74
The Court rejected the argument set forth by McElroy's that the agreement
provided for unilateral termination upon expiration or negotiation for renewal. 75
The Court dismissed McElroy's arguments, basing its determination on the fact
that the language of the agreement in question was "materially indistinguishable"
from that of cases brought before the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit
76

Courts.

In interpreting the pre-hire agreement from a plain meaning analysis, the
Court found that there could be only two alternatives upon the expiration of the
agreement: automatic renewal on an annual basis, or, if notice was given ninetydays prior to the expiration date, the other party would have an obligation to engage in the negotiation of a renewal agreement.77 Moreover, the Court found that
McElroy's notice of intent to terminate the agreement on the expiration date did
not affect the contractual obligations of the parties under the agreement. 7' This
interpretation was consistent with the understanding of the agreement raised by
McElroy's in its brief and conceded by Union in its reply that there was "nothing
[could] do to effectively repudiate the agreement upon its expirathe employer
79
tion."9

71. Id. at 1099.
72. Id. at 1097.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1098-99 (citing Sheet Metal Workers, Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 24 v. Architectural
Metal Works, Inc., 259 F.3d 418, 428-29 (6th Cir. 2001); Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 20 v.
Baylor Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 877 F.2d 547, 551 (7th Cir. 1989); Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 545 v. Hope Elec. Corp., 380 F.3d 1084, 1090 n.5 (8th Cir. 2004); Beach Air
Conditioning & Heating, Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 102, 55 F.3d 474,
478 (9th Cir. 1995)).
77. Id. at 1098.
78. Id.
79. See Plaintiffs Reply in Support of Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. McElroy's, Inc., No. 5:05-cv-04086-RDR-KGS (D. Kan. Nov. 18, 2005), 2005 WL
3623194 (Union stated: "McElroy's complains: '[1]n effect, the three-year agreement signed by the
parties is actually a six-year agreement under this approach because there is absolutely nothing the
employer can do to effectively repudiate the agreement upon its expiration.' . . . That is exactly what
Article X, section 8 means.") See also Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. McElroy's, Inc., No. 5:05-cv-04086-RDR-KGS (D. Kan.
Nov. 4, 2005), 2005 WL 3623192 (McElroy's argued: "In effect, the three-year agreement signed by
the parties is actually a six-year agreement [under] this approach because there is absolutely nothing
the employer can do to effectively repudiate the agreement upon its expiration. All a union must do to
extend the term of the agreement by an additional three years is contrive some non-existent 'controversy of dispute,' and the NJAB will step in and intervene on its behalf.").
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The Court also rejected McElroy's argument that "absent active negotiation,
the Deklewa rule allows a party unilaterally to terminate the agreement on its expiration date." 8° In the Court's view, such an argument would only be valid if the
agreement did not impose an obligation to negotiate. 81 The Court stated that
McElroy's could not avoid its obligations under the agreement to "negotiate a
renewal agreement or to have one imposed upon them if one party timely gives82
notice of a desire to renew the agreement" by refusing to engage in negotiations.
This inaction, in the Court's opinion, would result in "deadlocked" negotiations
and invoke the right of the other party to submit the matter to the NJAB.83 Here,
the Court deferred to the logic and reasoning of the district court's opinion where
the district court had stated, "In our opinion, a failure of one side to participate in
negotiations for a renewed agreement leads to a 'failure of the parties to negotiate
a renewal." ' 84 The district court, in finding that a deadlock occurred when one
side refuses to negotiate, stated that a contrary construction of the term "deadlocked" in the agreement would "obviate the duty of the parties to negotiate which
was a duty they accepted when they signed the original agreement." 85
The Court found that the provisions of the agreement had imposed a duty on
"each party to negotiate and, in the absence of a [negotiated] agreement, obligate[d] them to accept the decision of the NJAB. 86 Applying the terms of the
agreement to the facts, the Court found that since Union had timely served McElroy's with notice of an intent to reopen and McElroy's had "deadlocked" negotiations by refusing to participate, the case had been properly submitted to arbitration
pursuant to Article X, Section 8 of the agreement. 7 The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting Union's motion to
confirm
the arbitration award directing the parties to enter into a renewal agree88
ment.
V. COMMENT
A. The Instant Court Employed a Conclusory Analysis and Failedto Address Relevant Issues
In McElroy's, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had an opportunity
to clarify how the principles of the Deklewa decision and the policy behind § 8(f)
80. McElroy's Inc., 500 F.3d at 1099.
81. Id

82. Id (citing Beach Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local
Union No. 102, 55 F.3d 474, 477 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the argument that "you can't fail [to negotiate a renewal contract] if you don't try" because it ignores the party's "duty to negotiate in the first
place")). The Court clarifies in footnote 3 that the absence of notice by Union as required expressly in
the agreement, the employer would not have an obligation to negotiate for a renewal of the agreement.
Id.at 1099 n.3.
83. Id.at 1099.
84. McElroy's Inc., 2006 WL 1044465, at *5.
85. Id. (citing Beach Air Conditioning, 55 F.3d at 477; Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Architectural Metal Works, Inc., 259 F.3d 418, 428-29 (6th Cir. 2001); M.R.S. Enters., Inc. v. Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 2006 WL 931572 at *5 (D.D.C. 2006)).
86. McElroy's Inc., 500 F.3d at 1098.
87. Id.at 1099.
88. Id.;
McElroy's Inc., 2006 WL 1044465, at *6.
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pre-hire agreements should be interpreted and applied to situations where a party's
statutory rights come into conflict with contractual provisions. Moreover, the
court had an opportunity to address a novel question for its circuit of how an interest arbitration clause should be applied to a contract that did not allow for any
means of repudiation upon the expiration of the agreement. The Court's failure to
provide independent answers to these issues, or to even address them, leaves many
questions open as to how there will be uniformity among the circuits as to the
application of the Deklewa decision to agreements governed under § 8(f) of the
NLRA and whether current inconsistencies are producing results contrary to what
§ 8(f) was designed to create.
The court in the instant decision adhered too strictly to the four corners of the
agreement and did not consider relevant issues that could be raised by examining
the agreement and interest arbitration clause in a broader context. Specifically,
the Court should have examined more closely the background of § 8(f) agreements and the possible effects of the Court's interpretation of the agreement and
the interest arbitration clause. The Court should have incorporated into its analysis how Deklewa stands for the proposition that parties to a § 8(f) relationship
cannot be coerced into bargaining for a new contract but also adamantly maintains
that parties to such relationships should be bound to their agreements.89 The
Court seems to have encompassed the latter in their decision but did not address
the applicability of the policy concerns that may be behind the former to the instant case. While the opinion supplies a brief overview of Deklewa's history and
progeny as well as citations to cases from other jurisdictions, the Court's analysis
fails to examine the significance interest arbitration clauses have on pre-hire
agreements and the building and construction industry. Courts should consider
whether interest arbitration clauses, when providing for a renewal agreement to be
negotiated or imposed upon a party, function to negate the principles set forth by
Deklewa by allowing for unilateral conversion to § 9(a) agreement? Moreover,
does an automatic extension of the pre-hire agreement provide the union with
more time to obtain majority support and convert what was supposed to be a prehire agreement into an exclusive collective bargaining agreement that is contrary
to both of the parties' original intentions? These are just some rational inferences
of how to apply the policy
concerns for pre-hire agreements that were raised by
9
the NLRB in Deklewa. 0
The conflicts that arise in disputes where interest arbitration clauses are imposed contractually to § 8(f) agreements are strikingly similar to the disputes that
arise when parties argue over whether their agreement is governed by § 9(a) or §
8(f). This is due to the distinction between the obligation to bargain upon the
expiration of a 9(a) agreement and the absence of such a duty upon the expiration
of an 8(f) agreement. In such disputes, unions in the construction industry have
89. See Harold J. Datz, Alternative Dispute Resolution-InterestArbitration and the National Labor Relations Act, 6 LAB. LAW. 127, 131 (1990) (stating "[1]n section 8(f) situations, there is a conflict
of principles."). In the footnotes of the article it was noted that Mr. Datz was Associate General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, NLRB, but that the article does not necessarily reflect the views of
the NLRB or its General Counsel. Id. at 127 n.a.
90. John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1387 (1987). "Unlike a full 9(a) [exclusive]
representative, the 8(1) union enjoys no presumption of majority status on the contract's expiration and
cannot picket or strike to compel renewal of an expired agreement or require bargaining for a successor
agreement." Id.
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argued that they entered into bargaining relationships pursuant to 9(a) so as to
impose a duty to bargain upon the employers following the expiration of their
collective bargaining agreements. Conversely, employers in the construction
industry have contended that they entered into bargaining relationships pursuant to
8(f) and therefore may unilaterally repudiate the agreement upon its expiration
without being subjected to a § 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice charge. 91 Still, the
court in the instant decision failed to address these interesting parallels leaving
future parties to enter into pre-hire agreements based on logical, but possibly erroneous perceptions of their rights. Moreover, how future courts will apply interest
arbitration clauses to various factual circumstances when they create relationships
far more restrictive than statutory § 8(f) agreements and whether that situation can
be distinguished from the trend in some recent courts of becoming more lenient in
allowing unions to convert their § 8(f) agreements into § 9(a) majority bargaining
status is also left unanswered.92 Notably, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has
been suggested to have "crafted" the approach for § 8(f) unions to "convert [their]
status to that of a majority bargaining representative under § 9(a) through contract
language alone. 93
B. The Issue of Whether InterestArbitration Clauses in Pre-hireAgreements as Applied in the Instant Decision are Consistent With the Principles of Collective BargainingNeeds to Be Explicitly Addressed
The open-endedness left by the Court's decision raises questions on whether
interest arbitration clauses and other mechanisms, when contractually altering the
parties' otherwise statutory obligations and rights, are effecting genuine collective
bargaining or whether they function as tools for parties who can take advantage of
the inconsistencies in this area of law to gain disproportionate bargaining power
over their labor agreements.
While cases such as the instant decision might raise some concern about the
loss of bargaining power by parties who enter into pre-hire agreements with no
avenue but interest arbitration at the agreement's expiration, such concerns are
arguably misplaced from a general labor law perspective. In the context of federal
labor law it has been said, "Parties to a collective bargaining agreement are conclusively presumed to have equal bargaining power, and union agents have no
duty to explain to employers the terms, conditions, or consequences of a collective
91. Caufleld, supra note 34, at 418-19. The author notes that "[tlhis assumes that the employer no
longer wishes to continue its bargaining relationship, because the 8(f)/9(a) dichotomy does not impact
the relationship otherwise." Id. at 419 n.37.
92. See generally id. This article makes that argument that while the NLRB has not overruled Deklewa nor reverted to the Conversion Doctrine, multiple recent decisions have set forth principles and
elements that clearly reestablish the Conversion Doctrine and "set a roadmap for unions to follow in
order to convert their 8(0 status to majority status pursuant to 9(a)." Id. at 414.
93. Id at 413. In footnote 110 of the article, the author states:
Tenth Circuit Senior Judge Monroe G. McKay sat by designation in the Third Circuit and authored Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Herre Bros., 201 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1999). Months
later, and back on his home 'court,' Judge McKay authored NLRB v. Oklahoma Installation Co.,
219 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2000), and NLRB v. Triple C Maint., 219 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).
All three cases are pivotal to the roadmap used to ultimately revert to the Conversion Doctrine.
Id. at 439 n. 10
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bargaining agreement., 94 This argument maintains that as various sized employers should be entitled to the enforcement of their collective bargaining agreements
with various sized unions, unions should be extended the same entitlement. Furthermore, interest arbitration is a contractual, not a statutory, obligation. An interest arbitration clause, as a non-mandatory subject of bargaining, is not a provision
over which a union could insist. Consequently, any stability in federal labor law
would cease to exist if courts began selectively rewriting or refusing to enforce
labor contracts in an effort to redistribute the parties' balance of power. The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under state
and federal law would inevitably disrupt both the negotiation and administration
of labor agreements. 95
While there is validity to concerns for uniformity in construing the terms of
bargaining agreements, such concerns should not be at the expense of the principles of genuine collective bargaining. Courts should have concern for the effect
that contractual provisions like interest arbitration clauses, especially in agreements with language and terms used commonly throughout an industry, may have
on the bargaining power of the involved parties. It is clear that not all parties to
recent pre-hire agreements have an understanding of the way courts will apply §
8(f) when the pre-hire agreement has been altered contractually from its statutory
model. A consistent number of disputes continue to arise with largely the same
issues in the context of pre-hire agreements arguably from the inconsistencies
courts display in interpreting § 8(f) to different factual 96and contractual circumstances, including the effect of interest arbitration clauses.
It is arguable that this inconsistency has led to knowledgeable parties contracting for terms that exploit the lack of court interpretations to their benefit and
will continue unless the issue is addressed explicitly for future contracting parties.
Despite the common understanding that one is bound to what he contracts for,
when one is entering into an agreement that he believes to be governed by § 8(f)
rather than § 9(a), it is not illogical for that party to believe that they are not subject to the same duty imposed on parties to a 9(a) agreement to bargain in good
faith following expiration of the agreement. Courts, including the Tenth Circuit in
the instant case, have shown that unions can enter into an agreement with the understanding that the agreement is governed by § 8(f) while also contracting, perhaps to the other party's unawareness, for extensions that ensure that once the
union has submitted an intent to negotiate for a renewal agreement, binds the other
party to negotiate or accept terms under interest arbitration. Whether this is an

94. Employee Painters' Trust v. J & B Finishes, 77 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1996).
95. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962). "[I]n enacting §301
Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules." d
at 104.
96. Compare Beach Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers, 55 F.3d 474, 476
(9th Cir. 1995) (construing standard sheet metal industry "interest arbitration" and "contract extension"
verbiage to contractually bind each assenting employer, following the union serving timely notice to

reopen negotiations, to re-renegotiate a new agreement or have one imposed by arbitration board), with
Indus. Turnaround Corp. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 248, 255 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that an employer's
notification of repudiation need not comply with the termination provision of the agreement when the
agreement is a § 8(f) pre-hire agreement).
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example of genuine bargaining principles is unclear. 97 On one hand the statutory
rights and obligations seem to stand in sharp contrast to those of the agreements
with these contractual provisions so the effect of the statutory exceptions granted
to bargaining agreements in the construction industry seem to have been ignored
or overruled. On the other hand, equal bargaining power is a long-standing presumption in the collective bargaining context and thus public policy arguments are
a hard sell. 98 Consequently, the fact that a drafting party may have realized the
benefit of interest arbitration clauses and other contractual mechanisms in pre-hire
agreements before the signing parties have either realized how to use such clauses
to their benefit or contract out of them remains an unanswered public policy argument. While there is some merit to either argument, as further illustrated by the
instant decision, there has not been a court that has engaged discussion over all of
the potential consequences of such clauses to different factual situations and how
employers, unions, and the industry as a whole will be affected in the future. 99
In examining the instant decision and other decisions in this area of law, it is
clear that in the context of bargained-for agreements in the building and construction industry courts are prone to uphold interest arbitration clauses and the awards
granted under them. In the future, however, hopefully courts will make it clear to
both employers and unions their rights in negotiating and repudiating § 8(f) prehire agreements when interest arbitration clauses are involved. While the statutory and contractual distinctions may seem clear from an outsider perspective, it is
clear from the instant decision and similar cases that many parties do not comprehend how severely some of these contractual provisions like interest arbitration
clauses can affect their otherwise statutory rights. Given the variances in how the
circuits interpret parties' rights and obligations under § 8(f) pre-hire agreements
even in cases concerning purely statutory rights, how the building and construction will achieve uniformity amongst the circuits for construing and interpreting
agreements varied by interest arbitration clauses when the circuits lack a consistent position on the principles and policies underlying § 8(f) agreements remains
to be answered.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the inconsistencies displayed by the circuits in their application of the
Deklewa decision and its progeny, hopefully the Supreme Court will at some point
clarify the issues about contractual and statutory conflict that arises in § 8(f) prehire agreements. Until then, when entering into a pre-hire agreement with an
97. See Loewenberg, supra note 47, at 134 (stating that the use of interest arbitration "would be relatively rare if parties had full understanding of each other's positions and needs and negotiated according to the integrative bargaining model.").
98. See Employee Painters' Trust, 77 F.3d at 1192. This decision states that there is a conclusive
presumption that parties to a collective bargaining agreement have equal bargaining power so that
unions have no duty to employers to explain contract terms. Id. Consequently, an employer who signs
an agreement drafted by a union only to later argue that terms should be construed against the union
when it becomes dissatisfied would not have a strong argument.
99. See Loewenberg, supra note 47, at 135 ("The future of interest arbitration depends on the vitality of collective bargaining, the structure of bargaining, the role of interest arbitration in the labor relations system, and the willingness of society to limit the use of economic power as a determinant of
bargaining outcomes.").
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employer, it is likely that more and more unions in the construction and building
industry will draft interest arbitration clauses to reinforce the interpretation of the
agreement that is most favorable to their bargaining position. These provisions
have been interpreted by courts such as the Tenth Circuit as acceptable to supercede the statutory bargaining rights and obligations provided to parties in § 8(f)
relationships largely without any public policy consideration or thoughtful analysis of the effect the terms may have on the bargaining relationships of the parties
before it or in the future.
Courts have been clear that the area of labor law has a presumption of equality of bargaining power that is not easy to rebut. Despite the exception to general
collective bargaining rules granted to § 8(f) pre-hire agreements, whether the
courts or the Supreme Court would ever interpret the law as providing special
rules of fairness for such relationships when the parties have contracted for special
terms may be doubtful but is nonetheless unanswered. Unfortunately the Tenth
Circuit did not provide any meaningful analysis on the issue and thus inconsistencies in courts' application of this gray area of law to factual circumstances involving interest arbitration clauses will remain.
THOMAS RISKE
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